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I.
A.

Nature of Case

On April 15, 2011, an accident occurred at the Lucky Friday mine, in Idaho's Silver Valley,
when the ceiling in one of the mining areas collapsed. At the time of the accident, two miners, Pete
Marek and Mike Marek, were in the mining area, which is called a "stope." The two miners had not
been directed to work in the stope at that time-indeed, they were assigned to be elsewhere in the
mine-but had gone there on their own. When the ceiling collapsed, Pete Marek and Mike Marek
were injured, with Pete's injuries proving fatal. This lawsuit seeks tort damages on their behalf, and
on behalf of their families, against Hecla Limited-which owns the Lucky Friday mine and employed
the Mareks-as well as certain affiliated corporations and certain Hecla managers.
However, Pete and Mike Marek were employees who were injured on the job. The worker's
compensation system is the exclusive remedy for such injuries, unless the actions that caused the
injuries satisfy a narrow exception to the rule. Specifically, the worker's compensation law provides
that employees are exempted from the exclusive-remedy rule only if the actions that injured them
were "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). This Court has addressed
the scope of this language twice, and held both times that employees may file claims in court only
when the employer or its agents had "an intention to injure the employee." Kearney v. Denker, 114
Idaho 755 (1988); DeMoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (1990).

No one contends that any Defendant intended to injure Pete or Mike Marek. Plaintiffs make
no such argument, and neither did the U.S. Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA), Heda's
chief regulator. So, unable to prevail under this Court's precedent, Plaintiffs attempt to reinterpret it,
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so that plaintiffs who

recklessness or gross negligence can sue their employers in court, in addition to receiving worker's
compensation benefits.
The Court should reject Plaintiffs' inaccurate reading of precedent.

The worker's

compensation law is clear as to the conduct required before an employee can bring a lawsuit for work
injuries, and this Court's precedent interpreting the statute is equally clear-and has been settled for
decades. Idaho's rule is also consistent ,vith the vast majority of other states, which have adopted the
same rule. Expanding the claims that can be brought in court would undermine the compromise
crafted by the Legislature in the worker's compensation law-a compromise that gives employees
s,vift and certain compensation regardless of fault, but also gives employers some certainty and lower
litigation costs. If claims of recklessness or gross negligence for workplace injuries are permitted in
court, that compromise would be disrupted, and the Legislature's intent thwarted.
Thus, this Court should affirm the district court's summary judgment for Defendants. The
exception to the worker's compensation exclusivity rule is clearly defined, and there is no question
that Plaintiffs do not and cannot satisfy it.

B.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on April 12, 2013. (R. 11-29) Defendants answered the complaint,
stating as an affirmative defense that the worker's compensation law is the exclusive remedy for
Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 42-53) On February 10, 2015, after discovery, Plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment on the exclusivity question. On February 23, 2015, Defendants cross-moved for summary
judgment on the same question. On April 21, 2015, the district court, the Honorable Benjamin

2

motion
977-986; R. 979(a) and (b)) 1
In a vm.tten decision, the district court explained that "[g]enerally, the Idaho worker's
compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for i11juries arising out of lli'1d in the course of
employment." (R. 979(a), citing Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757) The only exception, the court continued,
is where the injury is caused by "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." (Id., quoting Idaho Code
§ 72-209(c)) Applying this Court's decisions in Kearney and DeMoss, the district court held that
Plaintiffs' allegations of recklessness were insufficient: "In the case at bar, there are no allegations
that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to harm Pete and/or Mike Marek, nor are there any
allegations that Defendants believed that harm was substantially certain to occur." (R. 981) As a
result, the court held that Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was the worker's compensation law, and so
their lawsuit was barred. (R. 985-86) The district court entered final judgment on May 5, 2015. (R.
988-89) Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal on May 22, 2015. (R. 990-94)
On April 29, 2015, before the court entered final judgment, Plaintiffs filed a document
captioned "motion for reconsideration." (R. Adden. 14-16) However, that "motion" simply stated
that Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the district court's decision. (Id.) It offered no argument or
explanation whatsoever. (Id.) Plaintiffs did not file a brief in support of their motion to reconsider

1 The

original Record inadvertently omitted two pages from the district court's decision, so those
pages were numbered R. 979(a) and R. 979(b).
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court denied the motion on September 1, 2015. (R. Adden. 90-91)

C.

Statement of Facts

The Lucky Friday mine is one of the deepest underground silver mines in the United States,
with its primary shaft descending one mile below the surface. (R. 14, ,I 21) The mine is located near
Mullan, Idaho, in the Silver Valley, and is owned and operated by Hecla and its affiliated companies.

(Id. ,i 20) The primary method of mining at the Lucky Friday is the "underhand" method, whereby
the rock and mineral at each level is mined, and then replaced with a mixture of sand and cement. (R.
773 (Bayer Decl.))2 After that, the level in1mediately below it is mined and replaced with sand and
cement, and so on, as the miners follow the mineral vein do"\\'llWard. (Id. at 772-73) This method has
been used at the Lucky Friday for years. (R. 114-15, 11. 23:16-24:4 (Dep. Tr. ofT. Ruff))
In April 2011, one of the active stopes at the Lucky Friday mine was the 6150-15-3 stope. 3
At that particular stope, two mineral veins were corning together as they descended downward. (R.
773 (Bayer Deel.)) In the levels above 6150-15-3, the veins were still far enough apart to mine each
vein separately, leaving a keystone-shaped "pillar" of unrnined rock between them. (Id. at 773, 77 5)
However, at 6150-15-3, the veins were close enough together that leaving a pillar between them was

Doug Bayer was Mine Superintendent at the Lucky Friday Mine in 2011. (R. 772 (Bayer Deel.))
He has a degree in Mining Engineering, and was Chief Engineer at the Lucky Friday Mine before
becoming Mine Superintendent. (Id.)
2

3

A "stope" is a horizontal "cut" that the miners make into a mineral deposit.
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both veins together, without a pillar between. (Id) Because the Lucky Friday uses the underhand
method, that meant that the ceiling above 6150-15-3 had already been mined and contained a pillar.

(Id. at 781-82)
The mining plan was reviewed and approved by Doug Bayer, the mine's Superintendent. (R.
774 (Bayer Deel.); R. 495, 11. 9:8-16 (Bayer Dep.); App. Brief 28) It was also reviewed by John
Jordan, the mine's General Manager. (R. 780-81 (Jordan Deel.)) Both Bayer and Jordan are mining
engineers, and both served previously as the mine's Chief Mining Engineer. (R. 772 (Bayer Deel.);
R. 780 (Jordan Deel.)) Bayer concluded that the mimng plan was safe, because the rock at the Lucky
Friday mine experiences horizontal pressure-that

pressure pushing in from the sides-50%

greater than the vertical pressure, which would push against the keystone-shaped pillar above 615015-3 and support it. (R. 775 (Bayer Deel.); see also R. 678, 11. 107:12-15 (Dep. Tr. ofT. DeVoe5) ("So
the Gold Hunter [vein in the mine] is remarkably less seismically active, and that clamping pressure
we talk about from horizontal orientation is very effectual and again why I wasn't concerned about
the pillar.")) Jordan likewise did not believe the plan was unsafe. (R. 782 (Jordan Deel.)) This
method had been successfully used before at the mine. (R. 775-76 (Bayer Decl.))6

John Jordan was the General Manager of the Lucky Friday Mine in 2011. (R. 780 (Jordan Deel.))
He has a degree in Mining Engineering, and was Mine Superintendent and Chief Engineer at the
Lucky Friday Mine before becoming General Manager. (Id.)
4

Terry DeVoe has been the Chief Geologist at the Lucky Friday mine since 2008. (R. 653, 11.
7:18-24 (Dep. Tr. of T. DeVoe))
5

Plaintiffs assert that the length of the "cut" at the 6150-15-3 stope was "for a distance greater
than had ever been done before at the mine," citing the testimony of John Lund and Doug Bayer.

6

5

at

1,

Friday mine. (R. 15, ,I 29) Both Pete and Mike were experienced miners, each with more than 25
years of mining experience, and with seven or more years specifically at the Lucky Friday. (R. 14, ,r,r
23-26) Although both Mareks worked in the 6150-15-3 stope v,rhen there was mining being conducted
there, they were not assigned there on April 15, 2011 because the stope was "muck bound," meaning
the rock excavated by the previous shift had not been removed from the work area and therefore no
further mining could be done until the rock was cleared (which would not be accomplished before the
end of their shift that day). (R. 791-92 (Dep. Tr. ofD. Stepro)) As a result, Hecla assigned the Mareks
on April 15 to the spray chamber on the 6150 level, which was outside the 6150-15-3 stope. (R. 791
(Stepro Dep.); see also R. 978 n.2 (Dist. Ct. Order) ("It is undisputed by the parties that Mike and
Pete were not assigned to work in the 6150-15-3 stope.")) However, theMareks decided on their own
to spend time at the 6150-15-3 stope, to water down the "muck." (R. 15, ,r 34; see also R. 978 n.2
("they were assigned to work on the spray chamber in the 6150 slot and chose to water down the
muck in the 6150-15-3 stope.")) To be clear, this was not a violation of policy-so long as miners
complete their assigned work during their shift, they have discretion as to whether to spend time on
other activities, or do nothing at all, for the balance of their shift-but they were not directed or
expected by anyone to take any action beyond working on the spray chamber. (R. 791-92 (Stepro
Dep.); R. 978 n.2 (Dist. Ct. Order))

(App. Brief 6, citing R. 717-18, 11. 13:18-14:13 and R. 500, 11. 26:24-28:4) Neither passage
supports the assertion, as both witnesses testified such a length had been done successfully in the
past. (R. 717-18, 11. 13:18-14:13 and R. 500, 11. 26:24-28:4)
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west

Mike on the east side, the ceiling of the west side of the stope collapsed. (R. 15-16, ,r 38) Pete Marek
was fatally injured in the collapse. (R. 16, ,r 41) Mike Marek alleges he suffered injuries. (R 21,

,r 71)
Following the accident, MSHA cited Hecla for "fail[ing] to adequately examine and test the
ground conditions to determine if additional measures needed to be taken" to support the pillar above
the stope. (R. 17,

i 50)

MSHA characterized Heda's conduct as "more than ordinary negligence."

(Id.) However, it did not conclude the conduct was willful or intentional. Hecla appealed the citation.

On appeal, the reviewing MSHA administrative law judge upheld certain of the citations (and vacated
others), but explained that "I do not believe that Hecla intentionally risked the lives of miners." (App.
Brief 11)

II.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same

as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Estate ofBecker
v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,525 (2004). In the trial court, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the

pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
oflaw." Id. "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question oflaw
remains, over which [the] Court exercises free review." Id.
Similarly, "when the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for
reconsideration, this Court must determine whether u\e evidence presented a genuine issue of material
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means the

for reconsideration de novo." J;,fassey v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 480 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

III.

ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Properly Determined That Plaintiffs' Claims Are Barred
Because The Worker's Compensation Law Is Their Exclusive Remedy.

The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the worker's
compensation law. That law provides that "the liability of the employer under this law shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents,
heirs, legal representatives or assigns." Idaho Code § 72-209(1 ). Thus, for nearly all claims of injuries
at work, an employee cannot bring suit, but has recourse only to the worker's compensation system
(the "Exclusivity Rule"). TI1e statute contains a narrow exception: If the injury was caused by the
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" of the employer or its agents, then the worker's
compensation law is not the exclusive recourse for the employee, and he or she can bring both a
worker's compensation claim and a lawsuit. Idaho Code§ 72-209(3).
1.

This Court's Decisions In Kearney And DeMoss Preclude Plaintiffs'
Claims.

This Court has twice addressed the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. In each
case, the Court held that "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" means conduct intended to
mJure.
First, in Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755 (1988), the Court reviewed a case brought by an
employee who was injured while working as a landscaper when her right foot was partially severed
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was for

"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression," and so fell within the exception to the Exclusivity Rule.
Id. at 756-57. Specifically, the employee argued that her employer did not install "a safety device and

a grip that would shut off the engine when the operator's hands came off the handlebars," which "were
included in the parts shipped with the chassis," and also that the employer "did not install a grass
deflector that was shipped with the chassis," which "would have covered an opening at the rear of the
lmvn mower that exposed the rotary blade and the cutting area." Id. The employee claimed that the
employer was "willfully, wantonly and grossly negligent, which negligence was so extreme as to be
substantially certain to injure someone." Id. 7
This Court held that the employee's exclusive recourse was the worker's compensation law.
It explained that "[t]he word 'aggression"' in the statute "connotes 'an offensive action' such as an
'overt hostile attack."' Kearney, 114 ldaho at 757. Thus, to invoke the exception, an employee must
have "evidence of some offensive action or hostile attack." Id. The Court held further that "[i]t is not
sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts," even

if those acts "made it

substantially certain that injury would occur." Id. (emphasis added). Applying this principle, the

Court explained that "[t]here was no evidence presented to the trial court in this case that the employer
wilfully or without provocation physically and offensively or hostilely attacked the employee." Id.
Consequently, "the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment against the employee." Id.

7

Plaintiffs argue that Kearney involved "merely simple negligence." (App. Brief 19) As the
discussion above makes clear, that is inaccurate. Rather, the plaintiff there contended that her
allegations were for willful conduct.

9

Exclusivity Rule "require[s] an intention to injure the employee." Id. It affirmed summary judgment
for the defendants. Id.
The Court took up the exception to the Exclusivity Rule again in DeMoss v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176 (1990). There, four employees sued their employer, which had ordered them

to cut up a boiler so that it could be removed from a community center. Id. at 176-77. One of the
employees had told the foreman assigned to the project that he suspected the boiler contained asbestos
insulation. Id. at 177. No effort was taken by the foreman to investigate that suspicion. Id. Instead,
the foreman forged ahead and ordered the employees to remove the insulation material from the boiler.
Id. He told the employees that "nobody knew for sure what the material was and that there was a

minin1al risk." Id. Later, the employer tested the insulation, and it did contain asbestos. Id. Even so,
a supervisor aware of the test results told the foreman that the material "was harmless, and that no
hazard would be presented by its removal." Id. The foreman again ordered the employees to work
with the insulation. Id. Only later did the employees find out they had been working with dangerous
asbestos. Id. In their lawsuit, they argued that the defendants "knew the material they required the
appellants to remove was asbestos; that the defendants 'lied' to the appellants by not telling them it
was asbestos; and that the defendants failed to provide adequate protective gear to the appellants, all
of which was tantamount to an 'offensive action or hostile attack."' Id. at 178.
This Court disagreed. It explained that "the plaintiffs all acknowledged that they had no
reason to believe any of the defendants harbored ill feelings toward them or wanted to cause them
injury in any manner." DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179. Further, although an employee had indicated that
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or any

defendants actually knew that it was asbestos until the test results from the laboratory were received."

Id. Finally, the Court explained, although the employer still sent the employees to work with the
asbestos after it received the test results, it did give them some protective clothing. And, "while the
protective clothing provided to the workers prior to the second round of removal may indeed have
been inadequate, that does not rise to the level of 'unprovoked physical aggression."'

Id.

Consequently, citing to Kearney, the Court held that "[t)he plaintiffs have not proved any 'wilful or
unprovoked physical aggression' as required in I.C. § 72-209(3), and thus the plaintiffs' state tort
claims were preempted by the Worker's Compensation Act." Id. And the Court further held: "To
reiterate what we said in Kearney v. Denker, 'It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor
committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur."' Id. It affirmed
summary judgment for the defendants. Id.

Kearney and DeMoss are dispositive of Plaintiffs' claims here, for Plaintiffs have submitted
no evidence whatsoever of any intent to injure. Thus, as in Kearney, even if Defendants' actions made
it substantially certain that injury would occur by implementing the mining plan for stope 6150-153-which, to be clear, Defendants do not concede8-that would not be enough. And, as in DeMoss,
even if Defendants knew the stope might be unsafe-which, again, Defendants do not concede-that

8

For instance, Doug Bayer, the Mine Superintendent, swore in his declaration that he "personally
visited the stope" on April 13, 2011-only two days before the accident. (R. 777 (Bayer Deel.))
. No evidence conflicts with Bayer's s_wom statement. If Bayer knew the stope was unsafe, as
Plaintiffs contend, there is no explanation for why he would have put himself in harm's way by
going to the very spot where he knew there would be an imminent collapse.
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when an employer or its agents take affim1ative acts with an intent to injure the employee. There is
no evidence of that here, and not even any allegation of it. To the contrary, Plaintiffs concede that
they argue only that Defendants engaged in "reckless conduct." (App. Brief 4 ("The Marcks, on the
other hand, contend that the rock fall at the mine-resulting from Heda's reckless conduct .... ")
(emphasis added)) And the MSHA administrative law judge explained that he "[did] not believe that
Hecla intentionally risked the lives of miners." (Id. at 11)
Plaintiffs' opening brief in this Court proves the point. In support of their position that
Defendants' conduct was "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression," Plaintiffs argue (1) that "[n]o
engineer review and approval was secured" (App. Brief 28) 9; (2) "[s]afety review and safety steps

Although it is irrelevant to whether Plaintiffs can satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule,
Plaintiffs have no evidence indicating that an engineer did not review and approve the mining plan.
Rather, Doug Bayer, who was Mine Superintendent, and is a mine engineer by training and former
Chief Mining Engineer at the mine, reviewed the mining plan for the 6150-15-3 stope.
(See supra at 5) Bayer determined that "I felt the 6150-15-3 stope was stable because of its V
shape in a keystone-type orientation and with the horizontal pressures that I am familiar with in
the Gold Hunter deposit." (R. 775 (Bayer Deel.)) Further, Bayer explained that ifhe "had viewed
the 6150-15-3 cut as a hazardous mining activity, [he] would have shut down the stope." (Id.) The
mine's General Manager, John Jordan, who is also a mine engineer by training and a former Chief
Mining Engineer at the mine, saw the plan in advance as well and did not believe it was unsafe.
(R. 780-82 ("I had no reason to believe that this mining configuration would not be stable."
Further, "Based upon the information provided to me I felt that the mining configuration in the
6150-15-3 stope could be mined safely.")) No evidence contradicts Mr. Bayer and Mr. Jordan's
testimony. Rather, the evidence discussed in Plaintiffs' brief suggests only that the mine's thencurrent Chief Mining Engineer, who was subordinate to Mr. Jordan, did not review the mining
plan. (App. Brief28-29) But Plaintiffs submit no evidence that such review was required, or even
that it was negligent not to obtain such review. And Plaintiffs omit further testimony from the
Chief Mining Engineer that he had in fact reviewed the mining plan. (R. 533, 11. 15:7-13
(Krusemark Dep.) ("Q. Why hadn't you seen the map before when it was posted on the wall? A.
9

12

not

at

at

31 ); and (4) "Hecla was significantly sanctioned by MSHA" (id. at 36). As an initial matter, these are
all alleged failures to act, and so cannot possibly be considered "aggression" under the worker's
compensation law. Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). Further, they are classic negligence theories, and so run
headlong into the holdings of Kearney and DeMoss, as well as the statute's requirement that the acts
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." Id. None of Plaintiffs' arguments, not alone and not
in conjunction, contains a shred of a suggestion that any Defenda11t intended to injure Pete or Mike
Marek.
The same is true as to Plaintiffs' contention that "Hecla placed the Mareks directly into
danger." (App. Brief 34) This argument does not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, for,
even if supported by the evidence, it is no different than the employer in Kearney, who placed the
employee in danger with an unsafe lawn mower, or the employer in DeMoss, who sent the employees
to work with what at first it knew might be asbestos and then did so again even after it knew the
material definitively was asbestos. But, regardless, Plaintiffs' argument is not supported by the
evidence. The evidence is undisputed that neither of the Mareks were directed to work in the 615015-3 stope on the day of their accident. As Dale Stepro, a Hecla supervisor, testified, "At the
beginning of the shift, I talked to [the Mareks], let them know that their stope was muckbound and
that they would be working on cleaning the spray chamber and also repairing in the intersection right

Well, I - - you know, it - - to say that I didn't - - hadn't seen it is kind of a - - not a very good
description. I'm sure I had seen it. I had walked by it and looked at it."))
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1, 11.
74:10-13 ("Q. Do you recall what you were asked to do by Mr. Stepro that evening? A. Yeah,

he told us to work on the spray chamber.")) Thus, Defendants did not send the Mareks to the location
where the accident occurred; the Mareks chose to go there on their ovm. This alone defeats any
suggestion of a v.ii.llful act or physical aggression.
Plaintiffs do their best to hide this truth. Plaintiffs say "[i]t was alleged, and facts establish,
that the Mareks were ordered to work in a dangerous environment." (App. Brief 34) But they then
cite only to the complaint-to their unverified allegations. At summary judgment, Plaintiff'> cannot
rely on allegations to counter Defendants' evidence. See, e.g., Mc Vicker v. City ofLewiston, 134 Idaho
34, 37 (2000) ("the opposing party must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial

and cannot merely rest on the pleadings"). Plaintiffs argue it was "anticipated and foreseen" that the
Mareks might go to the stope, and that the Mareks did not do anything wrong by being there. (App.
Brief 35) But that is not the point. The point is that Defendants did not send them there-did not
take an affirmative act that might satisfy the "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" exception to
the Exclusivity Rule. Therefore, even if sending them into the stope would satisfy the exception to
the Exclusivity Rule (which it would not), the evidence is uncontroverted that Defendants did not do
so.

2.

Idaho's Rule Is In Accord With The Majority Of Other States.

The requirement of intent to injure is the rule not just in Idaho, but widely throughout the
country, adopted by both courts and legislatures. Indeed, one leading treatise explains that it is "the
almost unanimous rule" that "misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent
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not satisfy
9 Larson s Workers' Compensation Law § 103.03. 10 The treatise further explains:
Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such
elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly
ordering employees to perform an extremeiy dangerous job, wilfully failing to
furnish a safe place to work, fostering a culture of alcohol use at off-premises, afterhours company events, wilfully violating a safety statute, failing to protect
employees from crime, refusing to respond to an employee's medical needs and
restrictions, or withholding information about worksite hazards, the conduct still
falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental
character.

Id. (internal footnotes omitted). In short, to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule there
must be a "deliberate infliction of harm comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin." Id.
For instance, in Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989), the Alaska
Supreme Court reviewed a lawsuit against an employer brought by the families of commercial airline
pilots who were killed when their plane crashed. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer required the
pilots to fly even though, "[b]y completing this mission, [the pilots] would necessarily violate the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) flight time and duty regulations." Id. at 316. Further, other
pilots reported the employer's "disapproval of pilots' refusals to fly because they were fatigued." Id.

Larson's has been cited repeatedly by this Court as authoritative on worker's compensation
issues. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 338 (2015); Corgatelli
v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,293 (2014); Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. #401, 147
Idaho 277, 285-86 (2009). Larson's has also been held out as authoritative by other state supreme
courts. See, e.g., Helfv. Chevron US.A., Inc., 361 P.3d 63, 82 (Utah 2015) (describing Larson's
as a "leading commentator"); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Wilson, 199 P.3d 581, 590 (Alaska
2008) (referring to Larson's as "a leading text"); Kawakami v. City and County of Honolulu, 59
P.3d 920, 924 (Haw. 2002) (referring to Larson's as "the leading treatise on worker's
compensation"); Brittingham v. St. Michael's Rectory, 788 A.2d 519, 523 (Del. 2002) (referring
to Larson's as "the leading authoritative treatise on the subject").
10
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a night flight ... without adequate rest or sleep." Id.
The court held that the allegations were insufficient to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity
Rule. It explained that "the facts alleged fail to make out an intentional tort. At best, the complaint
alleges gross negligence or wilful and knowing violation of FAA regulations." Van Biene, 779 P.2d
at 318. The court explained further that "[t]he vast majority of courts have held that such allegations
do not constitute an intentional act allov.ing suit outside of the worker's compensation act." Id.
In .lvfoore v. Environmental Construction Corp., 147 S.W.3d 13 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky
Supreme Court heard an appeal of a claim by the family of an employee who was killed when a trench
he was digging collapsed. After the collapse, the Occupational Health & Safety Administration
investigated, and "issued four serious citations" against the employer, including for "failing to provide
a ladder to escape the trench; for failure to have a competent person conduct daily inspection of trench;
and for not taking adequate safety precautions for a trench over five feet deep." Id. at 16 & n.4. The
case was tried to a jury, which determined that the employer had caused the employee's death through
"deliberate intention." Id. at 14.
Despite the jury's verdict, the court held that the evidence did not satisfy the exception to the
Exclusivity Rule. The court explained that, to satisfy the exception, "the employer must have
determined to injure an employee and used some means appropriate to that end, and there must be
specific intent" Moore, 147 S.W.3d at 16. "The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness
that the act is causing appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great the
conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong." Id. at 16-17.
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court
of the possible consequences does not amount to a deliberate intention to produce [the employee's]
death." Id. at 18-19.
Similarly, in Rafferty v. Hartman Walsh Painting Co., 760 A.2d 157 (Del. 2000), the Delaware
Supreme Court reviewed a lawsuit brought by the family of an employee of a painting company who
had fallen off a bridge he was painting and died. The plaintiff alleged "numerous acts of negligence,
in violation of Occupational Safety Health Administration ('OHSA') safety regulations, includ[ing]
the failure to provide a training program for employees concerning personal fall arrest systems, failure
to provide a safe working environment, and a failure to meet necessary safety requirements in the
operation of equipment." Id. at 160.
The court held that the allegations were insufficient to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity
Rule. It first explained that "there is a split of authority as to how to judge an employer's conduct and
two rules have emerged: the intentional tort doctrine followed by the majority of states and the
substantial certainty doctrine that is followed by only a few states." Rafferty, 760 A.2d at 159-60.
The intentional tort doctrine-which is what Idaho's legislature adopted, as Kearney explainedrequires "a deliberate intent to bring about injury." Id. at 160. The substantial certainty doctrine
requires only "that the alleged conduct or condition permitted by the employer caused a situation
where the employee would definitely be harmed." Id. The plaintiff in Rafferty argued that the court
should expand the exception to the Exclusivity Rule by adopting the substantial certainty doctrine,
but the court held that "we cannot rewrite_the statute to apply the substantial certainty doctrine in
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court

not

"[e]ven if Delaware followed the substantial certainty rule.

Id.

Finally, in Grijfin v. Georges, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1979), the Arkansas Supreme Court
heard a case brought by an employee of a grain warehouse who had been injured when he was pulled
into an unguarded grain auger. Id. at 25-26. The employee alleged that the auger had "no grate or
any other protective guard" to prevent people from falling into it; that the employer had removed a
grate that had been there originally; and that there was usually grain lying on the ground around the
auger, such that people coming near it could easily slip and fall into it. Id. The employee alleged that
the employer's actions were "in direct violation of federal and state statutes and regulations," and that
the employer "could have easily been corrected by installation of a protective covering over the
opening." Id. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that "the employer was aware that this condition was
hazardous and dangerous to its employees and recognized the substantial certainty that it would result
in injury to an employee," but that, despite this knowledge, it "gave [the employee] a dangerous work
assignment which placed him in direct danger of injury by the auger." Id.
The court held that the plaintiff's claim did not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule.
The exception, the court explained, applies only to "acts committed with an actual, specific and
deliberate intent on the part of the employer to injure the employee." Grijfin, 589 S.W.2d at 27. Thus,
to satisfy the exception, "the complaint must be based upon allegations of an intentional or deliberate
act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act, and not upon allegations

ofwilful and wanton conduct by negligent direction to the employee to use a.device Jmown by the
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warn

was aware." Id. 11

The four decisions discussed above are representative of a large body of law from other states
that is in full accord with this Court's precedent in Kearney and DeMoss. Accord Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 23-1022 (exclusivity rule applies unless the employee was subject to "an act done knowingly
and purposely with the direct object of injuring another."); Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.,
30 P.3d 57, 60 (Cal. 2001) (holding that "intended injurious conduct" is required to satisfy the
exception to the exclusivity rule); Schwindt v. Hershey Foods Corp., 81 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2003) ("We agree with the analysis in the Larson's treatise and decline to adopt the
'substantial certainty' approach taken by a minority of the courts."); Copass v. fllinois Power Co.,
569 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) ("we hold that plaintiff is required to allege defendants
had the specific intent to injure."); Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. C01p., 637 N.E.2d 1271, 1275
(Ind. 1994) ("nothing short of deliberate intent to inflict an injury, or actual knowledge that an
injury is certain to occur, will suffice"); Johnson v. Mountaire Farms, 503 A.2d 708, 711-12 (Md.
1986) (to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires "an intentional or deliberate act by
the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act"); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 418.131 (exception to the exclusivity rule satisfied only when "the employer specifically
intended an injury"); Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 695, 703 (Minn. 2001) (the employee
must identify evidence the employer "consciously and deliberately intended to injure" in order to
satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule); Bowden v. Young, 120 So.3d 971, 982 (Miss. 2013)
("the plaintiff must show actual intent to injure the employee"); Light v. JC. Indus., 926 S.W.2d
25, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy "so long as the
employer does not intentionally injure the employee"); Harris v. State, 294 P.3d 382, 386 (Mont.
2013) (an employee must show "an intentional and deliberate act specifically and actually intended
to cause injury"); Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 8 P.3d 837, 840 (Nev. 2000) (requiring
that the employer "deliberately and specifically intended to injure them"); Pereira v. St. Joseph's
Cemetery, 54 A.D.3d 835, 836-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) ("the conduct must be engaged in with
the desire to bring about the consequences of the act; a mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk
is not the same as the intent to cause injury"); N .D. Cent. Code § 65-01-01.1 (employer's action
must be taken "with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury"); Kaminski v. Metal & Wire
Prods., 927 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Ohio 2010) ("the only way an employee can recover is if the
employer acted with intent to cause injury"); 85 Okla. Stat. § 302 (defining "intent" for purposes
of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule as the "willful, deliberate, specific intent of the employer
... to causesuch injury"); Peay_v:_J!.:§: §tU~a_c;_o., 437 S.E.2d 64 (S.C. 199-3) (enforcing intentional
tort doctrine, and refusing to adopt substantial certainty doctrine); Valencia v. Freeland & Lemm
Constr. Co., 108 S.\V.3d 239, 240 (Tenn. 2003) (requiring "actual intent to injure"); Vallandigham
v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 109 P.3d 805,810 (Wash. 2005) ("Even failure to observe safety
11
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join the broad majority rule that actual intent to injure is required in order to satisfy the
exception to the Exclusivity Rule.

3.

Plaintiffs Mischaracterize Precedent.

Rather than rely on this Court's authoritative precedent interpreting the meaning of the "wilful
or unprovoked physical aggression" exception to the Exclusivity Rule, Plaintiffs rely on other
decisions that are either not authoritative or do not address the scope of the exception.
First, Plaintiffs quote extensively from Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney (App. Brief

19-20) There are a number of problems with this approach. First, and most obvious, Justice Huntley's
concurrence was a concurrence. Justice Huntley did not speak for the Court in his opinion, and none
of the other justices (all of whom supported the majority opinion) joined his opinion. Second, not
only did Justice Huntley's views not garner support from other justices, but his views conflicted with
the majority opinion. Plaintiffs fail to so much as acknowledge that there is a split in authority among
the states as to the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. (See supra at 17-18) The vast majority of states
follow the intentional tort doctrine, and a minority of states follow the substantial certainty doctrine.
(Id.) In Kearney, the majority opinion held that the Legislature had adopted the intentional tort

doctrine through the worker's compensation law, thereby requiring "an intention to injure the
employee." Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758. Justice Huntley, however, argued that the Court should
construe the exception to be satisfied if"injury [was] substantially certain to occur." Id. (Huntley, J.,
-

laws or procedures does not constitute specific intent to injure, nor does an act that had only
substantial certainty of producing injury.").

20

Plaintiffs pretend as though Justice Huntley was just elaborating on the Court's view, but he was nothe was arguing that the Court should interpret the statute as adopting a different doctrine. This Court
expressly rejected the substantial certainty doctrine in its decision. Id. at 757 ("It is not sufficient to
prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts that made it substantially certain that injury
would occur."). And, finally, this Court in DeMoss made no mention whatsoever of Justice Huntley's
concurrence, reaffirming that the law of the State is the majority opinion in Kearney.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Dominguez v. Evergreen Resources, Inc., 142 Idaho 7 (2005)

changed the rule set out in Kearney and DeA1oss-and apparently did so without saying it was
changing the rule. (App. Brief 20-22) Plaintiffs misconstrue Dominguez, which did not address the
scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. Rather, it addressed only the question whether an
employee can file both a worker's compensation claim and a lawsuit. As the Court summarized,
"[t]he Employer argues an injury is either (1) an accident sustained in the course of employment, or
(2) the result of an intentional tort-but cannot be both." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11. The employer
argued further that, because Mr. Dominguez had filed a worker's compensation claim, it was
"inconsistent for Dominguez to continue to claim he was the victim of an intentional tort." Id. The
Court disagreed, holding that "an employee is not required to forgo the filing of a worker's
compensation claim in order to sue his employer for willful or unprovoked physical aggression." Id.
at 12. Thus, the Court did not address the question already answered by Kearney and DeMoss,
regarding the scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule; it answered only the separate question .
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a

which is not at issue here.
Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs' description of the decision, Dominguez explicitly refused to
review the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 12 As the Court explained, the plai.ritiffhad secured a default
judgment against the employer in the district court. Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 7. Consequently, the
Court held, review of the judgment against the employer "would be improper." Id. at 13. The Court
explained that "a judgment by default is a final judgment," and "no appeal lies directly from such a
ruling." Id. at 14. "If a matter was abandoned by the defaulting party and never properly presented
to the trial court, there can be no error by the trial court on a question it was never asked to consider."

Id. Thus, Dominguez did not even purport to say anything about whether the facts alleged there
satisfied the exception to the Exclusivity Rule; it refused to review of the merits of the defendant's
appeal from the default judgment. 13

Although Plaintiffs assert that Dominguez applied Justice Huntley's concurrence in Kearney
(App. Brief 20, 27), Dominguez did not so much as cite the concurrence, let alone purport to follow
it.
12

Plaintiffs argue that Dominguez must have spoken to whether the facts satisfied the exception to
the Exclusivity Rule, because, even in the event of a default judgment, "the deemed-true
allegations must still be sufficient to state a legal claim that supports a judgment." (App. Brief26)
But in making this argument, Plaintiffs simply ignore what this Court said-namely, that it would
not review the merits of the case. Plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that this Court reached a
conclusion that it did not actually reach. Plaintiffs' reliance on In re Elias, 302 B.R. 900 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 2003) is even further afield. That decision, from a federal bankruptcy court, involved the
same litigants as Dominguez and addressed the question whether the judgment of the district court
in Dominguez was dischargeable in the employer'sbankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 902. In
analyzing that question, the court held that the judgment in Dominguez had a preclusive effect on
the issue of whether the defendants acted with "an extremely harmful state of mind." Id. at 912.
It said nothing about this Court's decision in Dominguez, which had not even been issued yet.
13
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not), the facts at issue there are far removed from the evidence here. In Dominguez, the employer

ordered an employee to enter and clean a tank the emplOyer knew contained cyanide sludge.

Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9. The employee, JVrr. Dominguez, alleged-and the allegation was taken
as true because the employer defaulted-that the employer "knew it was hazardous to enter the steel
tank, but concealed that fact from Dominguez." Id. After entering the tank, ivfr. Dominguez collapsed
and lost consciousness. \\/hen firefighters arrived to attempt a rescue, the employer "was allegedly
uncooperative -with rescue and medical workers, refusing to accurately identify the material in the
steel tank and thereby hampering Dominguez's rescue and treatment." Id. at 10.
Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of any similar intentional conduct here. Rather, the
district court found that "Dominguez is factually distinguishable from the case at bar in that here, it is
not alleged that Defendants directed Pete and Mike Marek into a dangerous environment, it has not
been alleged that Defendants knew that the environment was hazardous, and it has not been alleged
that Defendants hampered or impeded rescue efforts." (R. 969) The district court was correct. There
is no evidence that any Defendant (1) directed Pete or Mike Marek to work in the 6150-15-3 stope on
the day of the accident-rather, the uncontested record shows the Mareks went to the stope on their
own volition (see supra at 6, 14); (2) knew the 6150-15-3 stope was unsafe-rather, the defendants
who were involved in developing the mining plan testified that they believed based on past experience
that the horizontal pressure 50% greater than the vertical pressure would hold the pillar above the
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scope of the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, Plaintiffs still could not satisfy it.

4:

Kearney And DeMoss Were Correctly Decided.

In addition to being the settled law of this State and representative of the majority view across
the United States, Kearney and DeMoss were rightly decided. The minority view-the substantial
certainty test-would not be faithful to the language ofidaho's worker's compensation law, and also
would disturb the balance bet\:veen employees and employers that is inherent in the worker's
compensation system.
First, Kearney and Delvfoss were rightly decided because they were true to the statutory
language in the worker's compensation law. The exception to the Exclusivity Rule provides that
employees are not exempt from the Exclusivity Rule unless their injury was caused by "wilful or

14

R. 777 (Bayer Deel.) ("I did not think the 6150-15-3 stope was unsafe when I reviewed the
projection map with Bruce Cox, during the weekly Wednesday geology tours including the
geology tour of April 13, 2011 when I personally visited the stope or in any of the weekly Thursday
meetings when the mining plan was discussed. I did not want to hurt anyone."); R. 782 (Jordan
Deel.) ("Based on the information provided to me I felt that the mining configuration in the 615015-3 stope could be mined safely. I did not want to hurt anyone."); see also R.R. 678, 11. 107:1215 (Dep. Tr. of T. DeVoe) ("So the Gold Hunter [vein in the mine] is remarkably less seismically
active, and that clamping pressure we talk about from horizontal orientation is very effectual and
again why I wasn't concerned about the pillar.").
Plaintiffs argue that the Dominguez defendant's attempts to impede rescue efforts are irrelevant
here, because Pete and Mike Marek suffered injuries during the collapse itself, and the injuries
were not exacerbated by the rescue efforts. (App. Brief 23 n.5) This misses the point. If
Dominguez spoke to the facts at all (which, again, it did not), it could have viewed the defendant's
impeding rescue efforts as evidence of his intent to injure the employee. Thus, the absence of any
such evidence supporting intent to injure here is a significant factor, regardless of when Pete and
Mike Marek suffered any injuries.
15
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aggression.

§

Kearney

were not

starting from first principles as to which rule would be best; they were interpreting the specific
language the Legislature used. And the decisions plainly were correct that "wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression" indicates intent. As Kearney explained, the term "aggression" connotes an
affirmative act, such as an "overt hostile attack." Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757. It is not possible to
commit an overt hostile attack without intent to do so.

Thus, Kearney and De]i.foss properly

interpreted the language of the worker's compensation law. Further, Kearney has now been the law
for more than 25 years, and the Legislature has not disturbed it, which is all the more reason to believe
the Court accurately understood the Legislature's intent. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616,629 n.7 (1987) ("Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, nor
have any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our interpretation
was correct.").
Second, Kearney and De Moss were rightly decided because adopting the substantial certainty
test would disrupt one of the primary rationales for the worker's compensation system. As this Court
has explained, one reason for the worker's compensation system is "to provide sure and certain relief
for injured workmen ... regardless of fault." Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 851 (2009). However,
that is not the only reason: Another purpose of the system is to provide something in return to
employers-"to protect industry by providing a limit on liability." Id.; see also 9 Larson s Workers'
Compensation Law§ 103.03 (explaining that one of the central purposes to the Exclusivity Rule is

"to minimize litigation, even litigation of undoubted merit").
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including, significantly, the limits on litigation expenses. As a practical matter, in almost any tort
case, a plaintiff can allege negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness. The difference between
them is not easily resolved without trial. As a result, if recklessness could satisfy the exception to the
Exclusivity Rule, the number of lawsuits against employers could rise dramatically, as would the
length and cost of each proceeding, because courts would be unable to resolve whether the employer's
actions were reckless, or something less, without a trial. Thus, as the Arkansas Supreme Court
explained in rejecting the substantial certainty test, "if employers are required not only to provide
worker's compensation but also to defend tort actions of employees and to respond in damages for
torts, there would be a subversion of the very purpose of the whole workmen's compensation
scheme." Griffin v. George's, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Ark. 1979). For that reason, Kearney and

DeMoss not only correctly implemented the Legislature's intent, but also preserved the compromise
on which the worker's compensation system is premised.

5.

Plaintiffs Misconstrue The District Court's Explanation Of Which
Side Bears The Burden At Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
that they have satisfied the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. (App. Brief 39-41) But they confuse
the ultimate burden on the merits with the burden at summary judgment. The district court got it right.
To begin, the district court's opinion properly articulated who bears the burden at summary
judgment: "Once the movant has established a prima facie case that, on the basis of uncontroverted
facts, the movant is entitled to judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that
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of Lewiston, 134 Idaho 34, 37 (2000)) The court also explained that "[i)n order to survive a

motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 'make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that pa._rty's case on which that party will be the burden of
proof at trial."' (R. 979-979(a), quoting Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,259 (2011 )) Both of these
principles are black-letter law, and the district court correctly identified them.
Later in the decision, when discussing the merits of the case, the district court held that "the
burden is on Plaintiffs to prove that their claims fall within the exception to exclusivity." (R. 979(b)
(emphasis in original)) This was not a discussion of where the burden falls at summary judgment,
but rather which side bears the ultimate burden of proof on the exception to the Exclusivity Rule.
The district court was correct that Plaintiffs bear the burden of satisfying the exception to the
Exclusivity Rule.

This Court has consistently stated that the employee must prove willful or

unprovoked physical aggression in order to satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. In Kearney,
the Court discussed what was necessary "[t]o prove aggression." Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757. In

DeMoss, the Court held that the plaintiffs' tort claims were preempted by the Exclusivity Rule because
they had "not proved any 'wilful or unprovoked physical aggression."' DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 17879. This reflects how the worker's compensation law itself is structured: Tue law provides the general
rule that "the liability of the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability." Idaho Code § 72-209(1). The law then sets out that the "exemptions from liability shall
not apply in any case where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer" or its agents. Idaho Code§ 72-209(3). The statute does not say
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unprovoked physical aggression; it provides an exception to the general rule that employees can avail
themselves of, which it would be their burden to do.
That Dcfcndai1ts stated as an affirmative defense that their conduct was not "wilful or
unprovoked physical aggression" does not change the burden. Defendants often, out of an abundance
of caution, state as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff failed to plead or prove an element of the
plaintiff's claim, to ensure there is no confusion that they plan to pursue the issue. But restating an
element of the plaintiff's claim as an affirmative defense does not change where the burden of proof
resides.

Roe v. Albertson s, Inc., 141 Idaho 524 (2005) is not inconsistent with this argument, or with
Kearney and De}vfoss. In Roe, the question presented was whether the Exclusivity Rule applied at
all-the general Exclusivity Rule, not the exception to it. In deciding that question, this Court first
described the summary judgment burden, and did so exactly as the district court did in this case:
"Albertson's, as the moving party, must show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that
Doe would have been covered by worker's compensation and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." Id. at 530. Second, on the merits, the Court held that the employer "must demonstrate Doe
suffered an injury covered by workers compensation." Id. This ruling did not purport to conflict with
what the Court had described in Kearney and DeMoss, nor did it in fact conflict with them: \Vhere a
defendant responds to a tort action by claiming that the Exclusivity Rule applies, it bears the burden
of proving that the general rule applies. That is Roe. However, where everyone admits that the general

28

IS

employee's burden to establish. That is Kearney and Delvfoss.
It is also the case at bar. Here, all the parties agree that Plaintiffs' claims are subject to worker's
compensation-indeed, Plaintiffs long ago filed worker's compensation claims (which have been
paid).

The only question is whether Plaintiffs can prove the "wilful or unprovoked physical

aggression" that would permit them an exception to the Exclusivity Rule, allowing them to sue in
addition to filing worker's compensation claims. The district court correctly followed this Court's
precedent in holding that Plaintiffs bear the burden on the merits of that argument.
But, regardless, the district court properly implemented the burden at the summary judgment
stage. Defendants introduced evidence that they had no intent to injure the Mareks-that is, that the
exception to the Exclusivity Rule did not apply. 16 At that point, having established the prima facie
case of entitlement to summary judgment, the burden fell to Plaintiffs to set forth specific facts
countering Defendants' evidence as to Defendants' intent. Plaintiffs did not. The district court
correctly held that "Plaintiffs have failed to put forth evidence that Defendants harbored any ill \\ill
toward Mike and/or Pete, nor have Plaintiffs put forth any evidence the Defendants wanted to cause
injury or death to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material
fact on the issue of whether Idaho Worker's Compensation provides Plaintiffs their exclusive
remedy." (R. 984) Plaintiffs disagree that their evidence does not satisfy the exception to the

. ... ..... ~-

16 R.

.......

~

777 (Deel. Doug Bayer) ("I did not want to hurt anyone."); R. 782 (Deel. John Jordan) ("I
did not want to hurt anyone.").
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judgment.
Additionally, who ultimately bears the burden on the merits of whether the exception applies
is not presented by th.is case. That is, this case does not turn on whether tl1e exception is pa._rt of
Plaintiffs' claim or an affirmative defense. Rather, the district court correctly explained that "[i]n the
case at bar, there are no allegations that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to hann Pete
and/or Mike Marek, nor are there any allegations that Defendants believed that harm was substantially
ce1tain to occur." (R. 981) At that point, it does not matter which side bears the burden of proof. It
is clear from either point of view that the exception does not apply.

B.

The District Court Correctly Held That There Are No Disputed Issues Of
Material Fact Precluding Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs' second argument on appeal is that the district court wrongly held that there are no
disputed issues of material fact that prevented it from ruling on the legal question whether the
exception to the Exclusivity Rule applies here. (App. Brief 41-42) This argument merely rehashes
Plaintiffs' attempt to reinterpret what satisfies the exception to the Exclusivity Rule. For the reasons
explained above, Kearney and DeMoss are good law, and they require an intent to injure. Because
the district court correctly held that there is no evidence of any intent to injure, it was correct that
"whether Defendants received warnings that the mining practices were dangerous and whether it was
necessary for the chief engineer to approve the mining plan" do not preclude summary judgment. (R.
984)
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Servants And Immune From Suit.
The worker's compensation law provides that "[t]he exemption from liability given an
employer by this section shall also extend to the employer's surety and to all officers, agents, servants
and employees of the employer." Idaho Code § 72-209(3). As a result, the district court correctly
held that the individual defendants in this case are "immune from liability" under the Exclusivity Rule
the same way that Hecla and its corporate affiliates are. (R. 985)
Plaintiffs' argument that the individual defendants were not entitled to summary judgment is
based on the same arguments Plaintiffs made as to Hecla, and is wTOng for the same reasons
articulated above.

D.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration.

Plaintiffs' final argument is that the district court improperly denied their motion to reconsider.
(App. Brief 43-45) But the motion was improper both procedurally and on the merits. Thus, the
district court's denial of it was proper.

1.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Plaintiffs'
Motion To Reconsider.

The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to reconsider for two reasons:
First, Plaintiffs failed to timely file a particularized statement of the grounds for the motion until
months too late. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B) provides that motions to reconsider may
not be filed more than fourteen days after entry of final judgment. And Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
7(b)(1) provides that all motions "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor." The district
cow-t entered final judgment on }.1ay 5, 2015. (R. 988-89) Plait1tiffs filed a document captioned a
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not comply
with Rule 7(b)(1) because it did not state with particularity its grounds for seeking reconsideration.
Plaintiffs did not file a document that stated their grounds for seeking reconsideration until August 4,
2015, well after the fourteen-day period after final judgment within which the mks permitted them
to file a motion to reconsider. (R. Adden. 40-48)
The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs had filed their actual motion to reconsider too
late. (Tr. 9:2-5 ("So I'm going to find that you're correct, .Mr. Ramsden, in your interpretation of the
rules ... ")) However, the court then held that it would hear Plaintiffs' motion anyway. (Id.(" . .. but
I'm going to decline your invitation to refuse to hear the plaintiffs' motion.")) That decision was
improper. Rule 11 ( a)(2)(B) does not give courts discretion to forgive untimely motions to reconsider,
and Rule 7(b)(1) does not give courts discretion to disregard the requirement that all motions must
state their grounds for relief. Thus, the court lacked discretion to disregard what it admitted was
Plaintiffs' failure to file timely.
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs' August 2015 motion was considered something other than a
motion to reconsider, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it because Plaintiffs filed a notice
of appeal on May 22, 2015 that divested the district court of jurisdiction for most purposes. (R. 99095) As this Court has explained, "[o]nee a notice of appeal has been perfected the district court is
divested of jurisdiction and the proceedings are stayed during the pendency of the appeal." H & V
Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd ofProf Engineers & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,648 (1987).

Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b) contains exceptions to that divestiture, providing specific actions that the
district court can take, but Plaintiffs' belated motion would not fall into any of them. Once Plaintiffs
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was forfeited.
2.

The District Court's Ruling Denying Plaintiffs' Motion To Reconsider
On The Merits Was Correct.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court's decision denying their motion to reconsider on the
merits was erroneous for three reasons: (1) incorrect assignment of the burden of proof on affirmative
defenses on cross-motions for swnmary judgment; (2) the scope of the Mareks' work on April 15,
2011; and (3) the import of the MSHA decision after entry of summary judgment. (App. Brief 43)
Notwithstanding the district court's lack of jurisdiction to consider the motion, the court's rejection of
Plaintiffs' arguments was correct.
First, as to the burden at summary judgment, the district court's decision was correct for the
reasons discussed above. (See supra at 27-31) As the district court explained, "Hecla clearly met any
initial burden it had pleading the affirmative defense, by presenting a record that shows there is no
wilful or unprovoked physical aggression." (Tr. 26: 1-3)
Second, the district court correctly ruled that it is irrelevant whether the Mareks were acting
within the scope of the work by being in the 6150-15-3 stope on April 15, 2011. The court correctly
explained that "that's not the test." (Tr. 26:13-19) Rather, if relevant at all, the question would be
"was there express direction to go in there which amounted to wilful or unprovoked physical
aggression." (Id.) The court correctly held that it is uncontroverted that there was no such direction.

(See supra at 6, 14) Further, even if Plaintiffs had been directed to the stope, it would not satisfy
Kearney and DeMoss, for the reasons explained above. (See supra at 13-14) Plaintiffs' argument to
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Third, Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to consider the decision of an MSHA
administrative law judge affirming some ofMSHA's earlier citations against Hecla. (App. Brief 4345) (He vacated other citations.) But again, this argument relies on a reinterpretation of Kearney and

DeA1oss that Plaintiffs advance in the main part of their argument and that the district court correctly
rejected. The MSHA administrative law judge explicitly found that "I do not believe that Hecla
intentionally risked the lives of miners." (App. Brief 11) That he concluded Hecla was reckless does
not satisfy the exception to the Exclusivity Rule, as explained above. As the court explained, "I can
get negligence, I cai'l. get to maybe some sort of aggravated negligence, but I can't get beyond
negligence. There just aren't the facts that bring this case within the exception." (Tr. 25:12-15)
Further, as the district court correctly held, the MSHA administrative law judge's decision is
inadmissible hearsay, and so could not have been properly considered on summary judgment, even if
Plaintiffs had submitted it with their earlier briefs. (Tr. 25:12-14 ("I don't believe I'm bound by that
person's findings.")); I.R.E. 803(8) (providing that "factual findings resulting from special
investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident" are not excepted from the rule against the
admission of hearsay); Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 251 (2010)
(affirming the exclusion of testimony from an investigation by the Idaho Real Estate Commission);
Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 246 (1998) (affirming exclusion of determination

by the Idaho Human Rights Commission).
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The exception to the Exclusivity Rule requires "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression."
"Wilful or unprovoked physical aggression" requires Defendants to have intended to injure Pete or
Mike Marek. No evidence of such intent exists on this record and no genuine issue of fact exists. The
district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants was proper, and should
affirmed.
DATED this 17th day of February, 2016.

ARRIS, LLP

By~__.:;...<:-__,#'-,,;.,c.....-L---"""-~~~~~~

Theron
e Smet, Of the Firm
Attom ys for Defendants/Respondents
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day ofFebruary, 2016, I served two true and correct
copies of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
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Keely E. Duke
Bryan A. Nikels
Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC
P.O. Box 7387
Boise, ID 83707

_ _ Overnight Mail
_ ~ d Delivered
_v'F_acisimile (208) 342-3299

Edward B. Havas
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
36 S. State Street, Ste. 2400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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